Some Quick Thoughts on Different Functions of Knowledge and Philosophy of Mind

Two things.

One is a question I am now able to ask more precisely because of a distinction I've made. The other is an answer that I've tentatively arrived at.

I can now put my concerns about natural science more precisely. My concern with science stems from the fact that all knowledge functions in two ways. 1. As a more or less empirically true statement. 2. As a narrative that enables and encourages certain practices. We tend to focus on the former element of knowledge. We think that truth, empirical accuracy, reproducibility, all that good stuff, is the essence of knowledge or truth. But we don't as frequently ask ourselves, 'what are the consequences of using this empirical truth as a metaphor or narrative that governs my actions?'

Two examples of these different aspects of knowledge.

The first: social darwinism. When folks were talking about social darwinism they were operating on good empiricism, clear reasoning, some evidence, etc.. I'm sure it seemed like a viable explanation of how the world worked. Empirically, it was legitimate. As a narrative, however, social darwinism enabled a lot of really bad things to happen. It allowed people to justify manipulative behavior, 'dog eat dog' attitude, social engineering, and general cruelty or lack of empathy. Social darwinism has turned out, empirically, to be not the only truth about humans or nature. We are also compassionate, loving, caring creatures. Many creatures can be, it turns out. Social darwinism is an instance in which an empirically grounded truth had serious consequences as a narrative that governed behavior. And those two things are a bit separate.

It seems like things move from a natural is to a social should.

Second example: the brain. Yes, I am probably my brain. I don't doubt that everything I do comes out of that blob of meat. Empirically, very true. But, the real question I have is about the brain as a metaphor or narrative: What kinds of behaviors are encouraged by this idea that everything we do is the result of chemical or biological process that is largely mechanistic? My concern is that when we apply mechanistic metaphors and explanations to ourselves, as natural science encourages, we run the risk of behaving mechanistically.

These questions of mine are all related to Roger Smith's work on the concept of narrative self-creation, the idea that we can become something simply by telling a story in which that is what we are. Being Human is an excellent book and I highly recommend it to anyone interested in the philosophy of history, science, or mind.

The second point I'd like to note is an answer that I have arrived at about contemporary attempts to ground philosophy of mind in cognitive and neuroscience.

I have this suspicion that what is called philosophy of mind isn't actually talking about minds at all.

I don't think contemporary philosophy of mind  answers the question, What is the mind?

I think contemporary philosophy of mind is answering the question, What makes the mind possible?

Because when you tell me about neurons and all the things that make the mind possible you haven't actually told me anything about actual minds. You haven't told me what a mind is, you've merely told me the conditions that make mind possible.

This answer, I should be careful to say, is not small potatoes. What makes the mind possible is a profoundly important question and I am forever indebted to the work of psychologists and philosophers of mind who partake in the natural sciences.

My point is that we should think clearly about what questions we are answering with the kind of work going on in philosophy of mind.

If we want to answer the question, what is the mind?, we need to study history. Because mind is, as Collingwood knew, only what it does. There is no human mind, in its perfect essence, out there somewhere. This is consistent, too, with Deleuze's materialism. As Delanda says, Deleuze's real accomplishment was to create a materialism without essences, one in which we see reality as a constant changing flow. In that case, everything is pure process, there is no such thing as a state. Regularities are only temporary manifestations, which will break down into irregularities if given enough time.

The implications for the study of mind are clearer to me now: mind can only be what  mind has done. Mind, then, can only be known through history. What psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind can tell us is the conditions in which mental activity becomes possible. What history can tell us is what a mind actually is, what our own minds actually are.