Showing posts with label R.G. Collingwood. Show all posts
Showing posts with label R.G. Collingwood. Show all posts

Monday, July 2, 2012

Of Loneliness, Community, and History


Here it is, notes and all:

“I haven’t said too much, have I? There are things you should keep to yourself.” - Meat is Murder

1. The Story of My Loneliness
2. Loneliness and Solitude
3. Communities, Geographical, Economic, and Organized
4. History, Duty, and Forgiveness
5. Conclusion: Here I Am

1. The Story Of My Loneliness

I live a largely happy life. I am well liked by friends and coworkers. I eat good food. I drink good drink. I work hard to read, write, and stay thoughtful. I even exercise sometimes (throwin’ and catchin that sweet disc in the excellent way that I do).

The only problem is that words like ‘loneliness’, ‘alienation’, ‘nihilism’, ‘pain’, ‘suffering’, or ‘anger’ are never far from my mind. In fact, they are the words that I was raised to have ready at hand. Patersons sometimes have volatile, angry, lonely tendencies. No matter how much we love one another, no matter how much family and affection ease our pain, life’s grim realities are always waiting for their moment to return. Because attention will settle on them again and they will come back to life in a new form. It is very easy for me to feel, think, and speak in those ways, but I try not to. 

So what I want to do now is to tell you about this part of myself. I want to tell you the story of my loneliness. This story, however, needs to be told differently than my normal writing. For I am a philosopher, and my writing is often philosophical. Frankly, I speak most comfortably through references. But this time I won’t be doing that. I almost want this to be a memoir of sorts. I won’t be able to resist citing some philosophers or other thinkers. But largely I will be on my own. Telling you my story.

The story of my loneliness, however, needs to be told in relation to two other stories. 1. The story of my relationship with ‘community’, both in terms of concrete community and in terms of my conception of community. 2. The story of my relationship with history, this encompasses the history of the world around me, my own concrete history, and the history of my relationship with the idea of history.
Thus you can see the sections of this essay. From loneliness, to community, to history. Here I go.


2. Loneliness and Solitude

As I mentioned, the idea of loneliness or alienation is one that has been with me from the start. Aloneness is something that both of my parents openly acknowledged. I swear I can remember them both saying to me at one point or another something like ‘You know, I love you and your sister and your mother/father more than anything, but at the end of the day I know that I’m alone. We come into this world alone and we leave this world alone.’ Further, I knew both of them experienced intense feelings of loneliness and isolation at many point in their lives. I’m not sure what I made of this when I was young, but it has undoubtedly stuck with me. I’ve felt those feelings in me on many occasions. But on the whole I don’t think that I felt lonely for a lot of my life. I always had friends, I loved video games, and girls even liked me sometimes. Life through high school was largely good. Sometimes I was anxious or depressed, and yeah probably felt lonely sometimes too. There is a moment, however, when I can say that loneliness started to play a larger role in my life.

It was the summer of 2006. I had completed a year of school at University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC). In the fall I would be transferring to the main campus, the University of Maryland at College park. My status as a transfer-student, however, left me without on-campus housing. I was young and overwhelmed by the idea of finding a house or an apartment to live in. So I resolved to commute from my parents house, a mere 30 minute drive away. 

The social reality of my situation set in quickly. With very little effort at exploration I concluded that socializing with students on campus while living at home was going to be very difficult. I quickly lapsed into the habit of going to class and coming straight home, or maybe just skipping class altogether. I still hung out with my friends from home, but it pained me to be walking around a college campus full of peers and hardly speaking to any of them. I didn’t even have the nerve to speak to people in class very often. I was so painfully shy. I felt so incapable of initiating a conversation or of expressing myself honestly. Great pain hit me in those days, great feelings of loneliness. 

I can’t really even explain to you precisely what was going on with me. I was going through a lot of difficult personal things: the end of a long term relationship, a round of surgery that put me face to face with a traumatic child hood injury, a new social situation in a difficult housing situation. A constellation of events that really broke my heart. This was the first time in my young-adult life in which I felt seriously lonely and depressed. 

In the spring of 2007 I began working at the campus bookstore. I moved to College Park in the fall of that year. I met a fantastic professor and began to pursue military history, the thing I now intend to pursue as a career. Things were looking up in 2007. So much so that I declared it the year of the woodcat (woodcat being one of my many nicknames, of course). 

Acute loneliness left my life for a time. I was surrounded by coworkers who liked me and wanted to hang out. I was thriving intellectually. I began to mingle with the students and peers who worked in the building I did. But the power of that loneliness that I experienced in 2006 has never quite left me. In fact, I believe that something changed in me that year, and I think that the culture of UMD, combined with my circumstances, has something to do with it. I’ll return to this when I get to the section on community.

My time at UMD was really a great triumph. I lived in two excellent houses with many roommates whom I very much liked and still very much care for. My academic life was an outrageous, totally unexpected success. I underwent an intellectual awakening, learning to truly read and think for the first time. But socially I always felt like I was lacking. I didn’t pursue friendships like I do now, or would if I could do it again. I was too content to hang out with the same people, too hostile to clubs and other forms of organization. I didn’t date as much as I wish I had. I was very insecure. A sense of isolation still stuck with me. My new acquaintance with my intellect, however, gave me new ways of looking at my situation. 

The most substantial intellectual breakthrough that I made on this issue came from the distinction between loneliness and solitude. I was able to ask myself, ‘What is the difference between loneliness and solitude?’ In both instances, one is alone. Yet loneliness has all these connotations of pain and solitude of peace and pleasure. I was finally able to ask myself, ‘Why am I to think of myself as being lonely? What if I am simply solitary? What if I am enjoying my solitude?’ I remember telling my dad about this distinction and how it was helping me feel better.  In many ways, I think learning to think at UMD helped me think myself out of loneliness and depression. Never entirely, of course. But my new mindset, combined with my new friends from work and my intellectual triumphs, loneliness wasn’t a problem in 2007-2009 like it was in 2006. Sometimes I was lonely, but I was also capable of enjoying my solitude. 

In the summer of 2010 I moved to Seattle. I had graduated in December of 2009, and had been traveling and working in College park for the spring and early summer. But I had made up my mind to move to Seattle. I had friends out there, a bit of family. It was time to take a leap in life, move across the country. I knew that much of my life would probably be devoted to seriously scholarly work. So I wanted to spend my youth doing something wild, I wanted to live it urgently. I still want to live life urgently. 

There was also a bit of loneliness driving my move to Seattle. I had become frustrated with the social scene in College Park. I didn’t like many of the people. I didn’t want to move to Baltimore. Too many people I knew were already there. The loneliness I experienced then came from the feeling that there were so many people around me that I knew, but so few who really understood who I was or what I was all about, so few that I felt could really assuage the aloneness that I felt. I think I was misguided in thinking that. In hindsight, there are a lot of people who were around me who may have been able to ease my loneliness. I can now see potential friends, potential lovers, relationships that I didn’t explore because I was too depressed, wrapped up in my ideas of alienation and aloneness. That and a few girls did just simply turn me down. Lol. So my move to Seattle was in some ways about finding new people. New faces and bodies to make me feel less alone. Because the familiarity of my current world, somehow, left me feeling isolated. 

My move to Seattle, I think, was based on a logic that is characteristic of most modern conceptions of free will. At the time, I was thinking that I needed to remove myself from my present (determined) situation, radically break from my past and find a fresh set of circumstances in which I would be able to recreate myself. Modern morality, I feel and have been told, insists that freedom and choice are about breaks with the past, about the assertion of an individual will that is able to transcend personal or historical circumstance. This problem be rendered both in terms of habit and tradition. In his essay “Madness and Habit in German Idealism: Discipline between the Two Freedoms,” Slavoj Zizek argues that our modern conceptions of morality differ from ancient Greek’s precisely on the issue of habit. For the ancients habit was something that could be trained and cultivated, it could be a form of “organic inner rule,” thus an indispensable tool in the quest for freedom. Modern philosophers, like Kant, for example, believed that “freedom cannot ever become habit(ual), if it becomes a habit, it is no longer true freedom” (Zizek, “Madness and Habit in German Idealism”, 1, Google it). Alasdair MacIntyre, too, believes that modern morality characteristically endorses freedom as a break with habit or tradition. MacIntyre argues that modern philosophers like Sartre preferred to reject history and tradition as inauthentic. Instead, the individual alone is authentic, only you have the capability to create your own life beyond the circumstances of your time and place. “Indeed the self’s refusal of the inauthenticity of conventionalized social relationships,” MacIntyre argues, “becomes what integrity is diminished into in Sartre’s account” (After Virtue, 205). This view of freedom as separable from time and place, and as relying on a subject capable of exercising rational choice, is clearly problematic. We are not creatures without time and place. We are historically situated beings, both in terms of our own personal history and the larger history of our time. Nonetheless, I was, I believe, tacitly operating with many of these ideas in mind. I wanted to break from my history, from the traditions and habits that Janus had bestowed upon me.

I think this tendency to reject present circumstances in favor of a sort of rational autonomy can in part be explained by the plethora of narratives that we can use to explain our lives. Modern life is highly segmented. Within our own lives we distinguish between childhood, tweens, teens, young-adult hood and so on. In each of those phases I encounter more situations with more complex distinctions. I can choose my classes at the school I attend. I have to select a major and a potential career path. At each point I am presented with a new narrative about how my life will unfold, a new explanation about my life so far and my life to come. At every point in my life there has always been a narrative ready at hand by that I could emulate and compare myself with. It is this narrative density of our social space, I am thinking, that makes the modern rejection of circumstance and history appealing. I think that I was either overwhelmed by or unimpressed with the narratives I was already embedded in. I wanted this radical break that would offer the beginning of a new story. I am now philosophically opposed to this. The rejection of convention, tradition, and history becomes a weak position if we simply ask, “what would human actions deprive of any falsifying narrative order be like?” (Ibid., 214). What would authenticity beyond a determined social situation look like? In the final section on history I’ll be returning to things like narrative and history. 

When I arrived in Seattle I was too busy to feel lonely. I was living with a family member, I was applying for jobs the first morning I was there. I had old friends to catch up with. Loneliness wasn’t on my mind because I was on the frontier. I was exploring brand new neighborhoods. I was applying for lots of jobs. I was busy busy busy. What a nice and bizarre time it was. I began to have the oddest dreams. I would wake up at night and think I was in my parent’s old house, the one I grew up in and the one they sold. My mind was clearly dealing with a lot of new information. 

On my very first day I went to the University District to meet a friend. I walked up University Way, which from then on I would know simply as the ave. I saw a store, ‘The University Bookstore’. “Oh, of course there is a bookstore. Every college town needs a bookstore.” I had word for UMD’s campus bookstore and fancied myself qualified to work at such a business. I went inside and I asked the concierge if they were hiring. Little did I know, but I would come to know that concierge well. Seeing her many times, toasting many of her bagels. She kindly informed me that there was a barista position open and that I could apply on the third floor. To the third floor I went. The application I filled out. To the interview I went. And the job I was offered. 

I began work at the Bookstore Cafe on September 7th, 2010. I was initially apprehensive. Scared of making coffee and by my new circumstances. Thankfully, I stuck with it. Because now I reckon myself an excellent barista and I very much enjoy my work. 

More importantly to this story, the UBS quickly offered me many social outlets. I told myself that I wasn’t allowed to turn down an invitation, and I rarely did. I went out to many different neighborhoods with many different people trying several different things. I’m not sure how lonely I felt during that time. I can’t really remember. In December of 2010 I started dating someone, and that was nice. I felt less lonely then. We broke up eventually. After that I went through a bit of feeling lonely. I stayed single for quite some time. I was able to recognize what solitude was. I have been able to recognize my solitude. Because the situation I am speaking of is my current one. Pangs of loneliness that seem more minor than the ones of the past. I have many friends now, and I’m mostly comfortable with being single. 

The story of loneliness in Seattle is different from the story of 2006 because it has never been pure loneliness. It has been an aloneness that has intermittently been loneliness and solitude. Sometimes it is a definite loneliness. But that loneliness always retains the possibility of being transformed into solitude at any moment.

My solitude has grown vast during my time here. I wish I had my Rilke in front of me. Because it was only recently that Rilke spoke to me of solitude. And it is only in light of that reading that I am doing that writing right now. Don’t be afraid if part of me wants to drown my solitude by turning to other people. This is quite a normal reaction. It means, however, that there is something deep and vast in solitude. What a shame that I’m not able to recreate Rilke’s words. They made quite an impression on me. Branding my heart.

The story of loneliness and solitude in Seattle cannot be like the story of 2006. For in Seattle I have always had friends, always had new social opportunities presenting themselves to me. I have perhaps been less successful at dating than I would like. But I don’t fault myself for this. I just don’t seem to meet very many people that I like.

The story of loneliness and solitude in Seattle, instead, has to be told in different terms, in terms of the idea of community.


3. Communities, Geographical, Economic, and Organized

Before I begin this part of the story I’d like to make some general remarks about the idea of community. For the sake of thinking clearly I would like to distinguish between a few different types of communities. These different forms of community that I’ll be distinguishing will naturally blur in real life. Still, I find it important to distinguish between geographical communities, economic communities, and purposefully organized communities. 

By geographical community I simply mean that we come into contact with people and get to know them because we live in the same area. I see the same people on the streets, I see them in my apartment building. We begin to know one another simply because we spend time in the same geographical area. Geographical community, however, is inseparable from economic community. That is to say, me and all these other people near me come into contact most often in economic settings or in direct economic exchanges. Many of my exchanges take place in some kind of economic setting: I meet my friends at bars and restaurants where we buy food, I go to my favorite coffee shop and I talk to the baristas and see all the people around me, I talk to all kinds of people while I work. Of course these communities aren’t bounded by their economic background. Conversations still take on a meaning greater than the economic setting. We really feel for our coworkers and even our customers sometimes. But the economic setting still provides the foundation on which those interactions are built. 

Ok so the bulk of my social situations spring up because of geographical proximity and economic exchange. So what? Well, the only thing I want to note is that there is a certain type of community that emerges from the necessary business of life. Even if I just go about my routine of working I will encounter people, I will be friends with coworkers and customers, I will become a regular at certain coffee shops, and with all my new friends probably a regular at some bars, too. Community arises naturally out of my daily routine of work and leisure. This type of community, I will call ‘organic’ communities, (geographical and economic being examples). I in no way mean no imply that other forms of community are inorganic or inauthentic. I just want to be plain that there is a type of community that takes little or no effort beyond routine living.

There is also another type of community. Typically these communities are more purposefully pursued and organized. They are bound by common interests or practices, and not simply on geographical or economic realities. A group of people may get together and form a community, for example, because they like a similar type of music or because they share a common diet. Thus we have communities based on things like bands, vegan diets, or philosophical discussions. While these communities can also be authentic and ‘organic’, they differ in that they are more explicitly pursued and created. These types of communities don’t bubble up as frequently as geographical or economic communities do. The interests that bind these communities are by definition more specific and therefore need to be more purposefully pursued. Thus we find people online networking among fellow anarchists, fellow vegans, or fellow local bands. And we find these people very purposefully pursuing one another. 

These are the two types of communities that I want to distinguish between: organic and organized. (Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, perhaps?). Other than the way that they arise, what precisely, makes these types of community different? I want to argue that one way these types of communities differ is in the range of the references that support them.

Reference, I claim, is the crux of community. We cannot connect with other people and form a community unless we have some common knowledge, interest, or goal that organizes our language. In other words, ever community subsists on a certain pool of references from which its members must draw. In some cases, such as with organic communities, the pool of references is broad and consists of common facts and goals, such as the existence of money and of the practice of purchasing and enjoying coffee. No specialized knowledge is required to engage with these kinds of communities, their reference pools are broad. As a result, however, their reference pools are also very uncertain: we know what we have to say and think in order to order a cup of coffee, but it is not as clear how I am to handle the small talk I make with the barista. The broadness of the reference pool makes it easy to act generically (order a drink) but makes it harder to know how to conduct myself specifically (have a unique brief conversation). Purposefully organized communities, I think, depend on a more specific reference pool. That is to say, when communities are organized around things like diet or a music scene a more specialized knowledge is required to begin to engage with said community. One must understand the complexity of gluten-free or vegan diets if one wants to come into contact with those communities. Or one must understand the different bands in a certain scene. To function in an organized community one must accumulate the proper experience with the reference pool. One cannot move easily among a community unless one moves easily in its reference pool. 

I have little patience for highly specific reference pools (though I frequently indulge). I like my conversations to move strangely from one topic to the next, blending personal points with larger analyses. I also move very easily among certain specific communities. I can talk with other baristas about coffee and we will have a reference point that other people wouldn’t understand. I can speak in philosophical references that many people will not understand. I can talk about certain music in the same way. The list goes on. But in spite of my capacity for specific reference I stand by one conclusion: I must always be capable of engaging with an individual even if it is unclear what our mutual reference pool is. I always wants to be capable of abandoning specific reference and asking someone ‘so what do you do?’ or ‘whats up with you today?’. Because those questions operate at the frontiers of reference. We cannot get much further from specific reference than by asking someone what they are doing with their day.

It can be very difficult, of course, to speak to someone without a clearly delineated reference pool. But I so dislike those moments when you enter a group and no one is capable of giving up the referentiality they are comfortable with. I, for example, have gone and hung out with a group of four different people who all knew one another and knew a big group of people. I was around and none of them made a direct attempt to engage me specifically. They went about their normal referential business, talking about so and so who was joining such and such a band just in time for such and such festival. I remember being very disappointed that this sort of insular reference pool had put me at a distance from these other folks. I, too, have had moments where the size of my reference pool leads me incidentally to exclude someone. If I am talking with a philosophy friend, for example, and another friend approaches, there might be no comfortable way for me to initiate them into the conversation. We will say hello, but unfortunately I cannot welcome them into the world I am engaging in. They simply aren’t versed in the references, or I am not capable of translating the references into understandable language. In short, different types of communities depend on the existence of certain kinds of references, and unfortunately that referentiality is exclusionary for some just as it is unifying for others. 

This reality of reference pools, I fear, makes organized communities harder to get involved in than organic communities. Organized communities often require a more specialized reference pool. They require a certain commitment to a practice or group. Thus people are critical of insular communities. The size of a reference pool has a lot to do with this, I think.

In my life I have often just floated in my life until I encountered some kind of organic community. In high school and early college I just let my life happen is it did: I became friends with kids in my classes, I hung out with my roommate during my freshman year, I joined a few clubs accidentally. I let my wandering guide my socializing, and therefore I never developed any taste for highly specific reference in a community. Not entirely true, because I was the president of MESA. But I had no consciousness of the idea of an organized community that subsists on a certain type of reference. 

I first became aware of the appeal of these organized communities when I came to UMD. To put it more precisely, UMD was the first place that I felt envious of people who belonged to an organized community. There was one community, or constellation of communities, that I was particularly jealous of: I wanted to be at the place where the food co-op, the activism, and the music scene intersected. In that world there was a group of people that dressed a little like me, had tattoos and piercings and seemed to think things. I never quite found my way into that community. The things they cared about didn’t excite me. I was friends with some of those folks, and very much liked many of them, but I never felt a real sense of community. My community existed more so in my group house, in my classes, and at my jobs. I found all of those things a lot more exciting.

I think maybe I never found my way into those communities because I never felt like I adjusted to the reference pools that sustained them. I was never sure what I could talk to them about, interactions felt opaque, and I really didn’t know how to conduct myself. I think I’m very different now. But then I was never able to think along with many of those people in those more organized communities. I just didn’t feel very connected. And more importantly I was convinced that there was a reference pool that I needed to learn. It never occurred to me that I should simply disregard all my presuppositions about what I ‘should’ talk to someone about and instead actually just talk to them. “What do I say?” I once asked a friend. “Hello,” they responded. Ruddy brilliant. Just say hello. I use this move all the time now.

In my home, my classes, and my job, however, I felt remarkably connected to people. This, too, can be explained in terms of reference pools. Me and coworkers have a very clear reference pool that establishes our immediate relationship. When I first meet a coworker there is no uncertainty as to how we are to interact with one another. We need to introduce ourselves, establish a mutual understanding about the work we are going to do together. But from there we are free to talk about whatever we please: there is little to no pretense other than what is expected of us economically. 

I find that at work I am very likely to ask people odd questions, to go out of my way to get to know someone. I have done this many times and I will do it many more times. I am able to do this at jobs precisely because the conditions of my being around someone are purely economic, thus leaving our pool of reference simultaneously specific and vast. Specific in that we know exactly what kinds of things we can talk about: the job, the neighborhood we are working in, basic things about ourselves. Vast in that you can really get to know someone by spending so much time with them in a less determinate reference pool, such as with working or living with someone. Connections formed in this way are, for me, deeper and all the more satisfying because 1. they grew slowly and 2. they grew despite the fact that, on paper, we probably shouldn't like one another. I made many good friends at jobs who I had little or nothing in common with. I thank the work environment. 

In Seattle I have continued to organize my communities through work and living. As I mentioned, the UBS quickly offered me a lot of social opportunities. It is a big store, and working in the cafe meant that I met more people than your average employee. Very quickly, then, the realities of work and food put me into many social positions. A coworker invited me out somewhere, I went with them. That coworker was friends with other coworkers who I then became friends with. Before I knew it a year had gone by and I had many friends in many different departments. All unique people who I liked in different ways for different reasons. The UBS undoubtedly dominated my community for the first year or so I was in Seattle. Even when I left the UBS my jobs continued to organized my communities. Many of my current friends I met through the doughnut shop and the bakery, where I currently work. Work is undoubtedly how I have met most of my friends in Seattle.

Geography, too, brought me into contact with people. This is true both in the neighborhood I work and where I live. I’ve worked in the U-District, in First Hill, and Belltown, and everywhere I have come into contact with all kinds of different people: regulars at the cafes, people who work at surrounding bars and stores, people who walk the streets. It is fun to be able to go into the local bar after work and have the people know that you work down the street. We can talk about how busy or slow we were. We bring each other products, we give each other discounts, we tip each other well. In my neighborhood, too, I have become a regular at coffee shops, have gotten to know employees at certain stores, and have gotten to know a few people who live in the area. 

My communities in Seattle are therefore largely of the organic variety. I spend so much time working, eating, and drinking, that my communities have organized themselves around those habits: I know people largely from jobs, restaurants, cafes, and bars. I like this about my community. There is little or no pretense beyond economic exchange and geographical proximity. 

This doesn’t mean, however, that I haven’t felt the desire to pursue more organized forms of community. Seattle is loaded with people and places that seem like they ‘fit in’ somewhere. There are so many bars, music venues, and other ‘communal spaces’, that have a definite feel to them, that possess a sphere of belonging (and by default, a sphere of exclusion). For example, I live a block from a small music venue that is also a vintage clothing shop. I was at one point very curious about getting involved with this communal space. I quickly found, however, that that community was very loosely organized around a certain sense of fashion and a collection of local bands. When I entered one of their social events I quickly felt like an outsider. Everyone there was already sharing a reference pool and seemed to have very little patience for accommodating me into that pool. There were very few people who stopped and said, ‘oh, what do you do?’, or ‘how was your day?’ People continued to have conversations about this band, this person, these things. When I left, the person who brought me said that they were aware that ‘Riley has no idea who any of these people are.’ Yet they all continued to throw references around like I either knew or they didn’t care whether I knew or not. Good for them. It is nice to be comfortable in a referential world. I know. I have my own.

But at the same time I dislike this failure to expand a reference pool based on the presence of a new person. If I encounter someone new I take very few references for granted. I try to keep things basic, I try not to use words that are too opaque or referential. I simplify my language and I try to approach someone as candidly as possible. But, as I noted above, this is very difficult to do and sometimes I simply can’t do it. So I can’t really blame a big room full of people, already comfortably swimming together, for failing to extend the effort to talk to an outsider. And some of them did and it was an okay time. I don’t want to paint a negative picture of anyone. I am just trying to understand my relationship with the idea of community. 

This is not an uncommon problem, I think. Community inevitably finds itself in this double bind between two needs: 1. the desire to maintain a specialized reference pool (the community’s life blood) and 2. the need to bring in new members (the necessary condition of its continuation). It can be very difficult to initiate new members into a community if the reference pool of the community is too specific, too exclusionary, or simply too annoying. I guess I can say that I have very little patience for specific reference pools unless they seriously interest me. (I love philosophy, after all, so I can’t complain too much about dense reference pools). 

I fear that my attitude towards specific reference pools has prevented me from getting involved in a more organized community. Because Seattle is loaded with different groups of people trying to create alternative spaces, communal spaces, group projects that are focused on the good of individuals and groups. Foucault might say that there are a lot of people in Seattle who are involved in the creation of new subjectivities: new experiences, new ways of thinking, new ways of seeing, new ways of being. And Foucault would applaud this ‘limit-work’ that is going on here. But I just can’t seem to be excited by it.

Perhaps it is just because my daily routine already occupies so much of my time I have no idea how or when I would pursue these organized communities. It is true, there are a few communities that I’ve flirted with but have failed to join. In particular, there are a group of individuals who use the internet to arrange a time to drink and discuss philosophical issues. Drunk philosophy, they call it. I really ought to go to such a meet up. But I have failed so far to go. I don’t know what it is. But man I already feel super busy and socially satisfied with the work and friends I already have. I’m always open to new people and things. But I have a thing I’m doing. That, and my real passion lies in thinking, reading, and writing. Not in a certain type of diet, music, or social issue. The things I truly love to do are solitary things.

This is all I really want to say about community in Seattle. I have largely brought myself up to the present moment. My communities are still organized in the organic ways I described, and I still have failed to click with any type of organized community. At this point I am starting to doubt the validity of the distinctions I have made. Are those organized communities really so different from the ones that have sprung up in my economic and geographical world? I hear that many people in different circles also lack a sense of community, or feel like a little fish in a big reference pool. But I also have heard people speak very seriously of their community, of the connection they feel to people. I think that there are people out there who are having a very different experience of community than I am. But these people very well may have lived in Seattle their entire lives and have spent years accumulating this community. I am willing to admit my ignorance to what is really going on in these different communities, and to say that I don’t know what to call them, ‘organized’, ‘organic’, whatever. 
But there is something else going on in my heart. Some other feeling I have about people, action, and community. This feeling has something to do with history, my history, and my world’s history.




4. History, Duty, and Forgiveness

The thing I continue to work hardest on is a conception of ‘historical morality’. I want my morality to be based not on any kind of rule, or on any kind of analysis about ends and means. I want my morality to be based on my relationship with the past. I always want my choices about the present and the future to be framed by an understanding of the past. This means we acknowledge that in life "We enter upon a stage that was not of our making. Each of us being a main character in his own drama [playing] subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each drama constrains the others” (After Virtue, 213).  We are always born into a historically determined situation that partially dictates how we live. 

What this means is that historical knowledge is an indispensable element in the quest for free and moral action. If we don’t understand where we come from we will never understand where we are, and we will thus not be in the best position to make decisions. Historical knowledge, MacIntyre claims, exists both as knowledge of individuals and of larger settings: We must consider both our own unique history and the larger history of”the setting or settings to which [we] belong” (Ibid., 208). In my own work I have claimed that we need to think about both of these layers of our history: Our own personal history and the larger history that makes our’s possible. 

Moreover, historical morality overlaps with an aesthetic morality. History, after all, is another form of literature. Many authors (Collingwood, John Lukacs, MacIntyre) have convinced me that there is a deep continuity between aesthetics, history, and morality. To think of ourselves historically is essentially to think of ourselves aesthetically: Life or history is essentially “an enacted dramatic narrative in which the characters are also the authors” (Ibid., 215). Life and history are only understandable if they are expressed aesthetically.

This, in fact, is the main difference between the study of the natural world and the study of the human world: The natural world can be explained in terms of cause and effect, while the human world can only be explained in terms of narrative. The only way to explain action, I believe, is by reference to an individuals thoughts and feelings. This means that if we want to explain an action we need to create a story that renders those actions intelligible. Our capacity for morality thus in some way depends on our ability to construct explanatory narratives, which is really just historical thinking. Moral thinking, it appears, can only be historical thinking.

So, I’m preaching some kind of continuity between morality, aesthetics, and history, whereby we have to use narratives to explain both our own actions and the actions of others. But so what? What does any of this have to do with loneliness and community?

This idea of historical morality is relevant to the rest of this essay because it is the method of thinking that has let me understand and accept why I have the kinds of communities that I do. 

I have often chastised myself for not pursuing more organized communities. I wish that I had rallied behind certain causes in college. I wish now that I made music or had some interest that would connect me with large numbers of people. Coffee, perhaps, could do that for me. It does already. But I somehow feel that the coffee thing has just happened to me. I didn’t mean to pursue this. I’ve wanted to understand why I haven’t felt connected to other communities that I wanted to feel connected to. So how does historical thinking do this for me?

Historical thinking, at the end of the day, is the supreme form of empathy. To think of someone historically is to think of them as a unique individual making unique choices for unique reasons that only they could make at that particular moment. To think historically is to try and understand people’s actions as necessary expressions of their character and their circumstances. The historian understands that people do what they must do, that people act dutifully

This conception of duty does not mean that people are acting in relation to some rule. On that contrary, as R.G. Collingwood argues in The New Leviathan, “A man’s duty on a given occasion is the act which for him is both possible and necessary: the act which at that moment character and circumstance combine to make it inevitable, if he has a free will, that he should freely will to do” (17.8, author's italics). Duty, then, is a way in which we view our own actions: we regard them as necessary outcomes of our circumstances and character, what we did was what we had to do. Duty and history, moreover, are identical in the way they approach action: both try to explain action by reference to the uniqueness of character and circumstance. Duty and history differ, however, in that duty is a form of practical reasoning (by which we explain our own actions) where as history is a form of theoretical reason (by which we explain the actions of others). As Collingwood argues, “The idea of action as duty, as we have seen, is inevitable to a person who considers it historically.... The more a man accustoms himself to thinking historically, the more he will accustom himself to thinking what course of action it is his duty to do, as distinct from asking what it is expedient for him to do and what it is right for him to do; and the more he will accustom himself to thinking in the same way of other people’s actions explaining them to himself not by saying ‘this person did this action in pursuit of such and such an end’ or ‘in obedience to such and such a rule' but 'because it was his duty' (The New Leviathan, 28.9). We can now see how historical thinking inevitably leads to a certain moral attitude. To think historically is to approach other people’s actions with the greatest understanding and empathy possible. To explain action in this way is to think dutifully. This is, without a doubt, the approach I want to take to myself and others. As I’ve been saying for years, forgive everyone for everything (even if you still punish them).

For many years I have been trying to be a sympathetic historian of my own past. I’ve been trying to forgive myself for everything wrong I’ve done. When I reflect on what I’ve done, the choices I’ve made, I try to unconditionally forgive myself. Because I’ve done things I regret, I don’t feel good about everything I’ve ever done. But I don’t want to say ‘oh well I was being stupid’ or something like that. There were reasons that I did what I did, and I want to do my best to really understand and forgive myself for what I’ve done.

So if I haven’t come into contact with more organized forms of community, I want to be okay with that. Further, I don’t want to blame people who are in organized communities by saying they are pompous or arrogant or cliquey or this or that. I want to be able to understand and accept someone even if they don’t want to give me the time of day. Sometimes I still get pissed off, and rage out over this customer or that jerk. But at my best I try to understand everyone in the most forgiving way possible.
What that means is that I try to give people the benefit of the doubt by trying to imagining a narrative that paints their actions in the most forgiving way possible. Sometimes this takes some real effort, because people do such stupid things. To explain someone’s actions in a forgiving light is a serious task, and one that is so easy to avoid. It is so easy to just call people stupid and move on. 

Boy, I get overwhelmed by the challenge of thinking this way. I love to do this, to try and forgive everyone for everything. I try to understand everyone historically. I try to explain everyone’s actions in terms of duty. But it is hard. As I said, it takes a sort imaginative effort, a mental exertion. One that, I think, is aesthetic. Everyone conversation, every interaction, is an opportunity to create something, to act in a way that expresses your duty, to understand another person as acting dutifully. A conversation is an aesthetic-dutiful collaboration of sorts: “a conversation is a dramatic work, even if a very short one, in which the participants are not only the actors, but also the joint authors, working out in agreement or disagreement the more of their production” (After Virtue, 211). This is the way I want to think of myself and others: as unique people collaborating on our lives, embracing the constellation of circumstances and characters that brought us to that unique moment. Sounds all silly and exciting, yeah? 




5. Conclusion: Here I am

So this is where I find myself these days: trying to think historically, dutifully, empathically. I’m not lonely, and I have a diverse community that has been built piecemeal through living and working in this city. I don’t feel inclined to pursue organized forms of community, and I don’t feel any hostility towards those that enjoy organized communities. I understand why my life has gone this way so far, why I relate to community the way I do, and I want to (and might) understand why other people do indeed belong to communities in the way they do. It is an expression of their duty. And my life has been an expression of my duty. My character and my circumstances made it inevitable that I freely chose what I did.



Notes:
- History, duty, and forgiving myself for having the kinds of communities I have.
Well, what it really has to do with is the notion of duty in it’s non-regularian sense
- I fear that organized community is anti-historical in that it attempts to create something new without reflecting on what we are making something out of. It pushes into the future without regard for the past. Rather than forceful creation, raw choice, I think that reflection on the past can lead to something new.
UMD as first encounter with highly specific reference pool and also intense loneliness. Intense loneliness = response to the intensity of the images and reference pools around me. A loneliness so intense can only exist in relation to a community that doesn’t actually exist, a simulacra of community, creating a simulacra, intense loneliness. GOTTA INCOPROATE ALL OF THIS UP THERE
 say something more about people not being able to engage with a stranger and just engaging with the ingroup. Something about how moreover it is my duty to talk to people even if they are excluded from the reference pool.
From there 
- Community in Seattle has to do with the fact that I am very social, generally well liked, have had some success with women, and that I still feel this alienation, this isolation, that I hope community could solve. But so far it cant. 
  • Something at some point in the history section on narrative understanding and human self creation
- COMMUNITY AND REFERENT! With geography, economics, there is a central referent, but one that is loose and can be quickly shed if one knows what they are doing. Other communities, however, don’t always lose their referent so easily. 
  • *** ALSO! Very important: Something about history and particularity and community. Something about Kahneman and psychology not teaching that kind of appreciation. Something about Cairo and psychology appreciating generality. 
Of history will be plainly stated
I will casually and with minimal reference describe the major tenants of what I’m working towards.
Of History
- I fear that
- The main point of this section will be the feat that organized communities discourage historical thinking. Organized communities thrive on specialized reference pools. Specialized reference, according to Hedges and Berry, makes us disconnected from your everyday person, makes it hard for us to appreciate what is unique and novel in the world. It gives things a sheen of normalcy or classifiability. History, on the contrary, is about the appreciation of the individual, about action as duty. I, of course, cannot avoid the conclusion that in order to understand these people who are tacitly embracing antihistorical forms of thought are also acting out of duty. I must give into the temptation to think of them historically.
I. Art and History
Both of them containing ‘organic’ qualities, we do it because we must, both in art and duty and history
II. Narrativity in life
- Narativity and morality. SOmething about morality in relation to the size of the reference pool. For if one exists in a small, dense reference pool then one has less options for creating unique narratives, and thus a rare chance for morality. 
Art and history


Tuesday, May 29, 2012

Repetition and Newness as Double Bind

The principle concept in Gayatri Spivak's new anthology, An Aesthetic Education in the Era of Globalization, is that of the 'double bind'. The notion of a double bind encompasses dichotomies like such as man vs woman, planet vs globe, modern vs traditional. In other words, a double bind appears to be something like a Kantian antinomy: the point at which two perfectly logical but incompatible ideas cannot be synthesized any further. A double bind is thus a position between two concepts that cannot be further synthesized or made any more compatible with one another.

Spivak claims that the humanities are the disciplines that commonly seek to resolve double binds. This is evident in disciplines like the study of gender or post-colonial studies. In both instances the humanities seek to mitigate the divide between the concepts of man and woman, or the notion of Otherness. Spivak uses Schiller as a prime example of the way in which aesthetic or humane education usually attempts to synthesize or overcome a double bind. Spivak quotes Schiller's claim that aesthetic philosophy often fails because "either the investigation did not start with a sufficiently strict distinction, or it was not carried through to a pure and complete synthesis" (Quoted in Spivak, 2012, 19).

According to Spivak this attempt at synthesis is an inadequate way to deal with a double bind. Rather than pushing for ultimate synthesis, Spivak argues, one should seek to 'play' a double bind. One must try to navigate an antinomy not through synthesis, but through a sort of balancing act that arrives at something new. One must 'ab-use' the double bind that one is presented with.

Spivak chooses to use the term 'ab-use', which is entirely different from abuse. This notion of ab-use comes through most clearly as a way of using other people's ideas. To 'ab-use' an idea is to approach it knowing that you are going to distort it in the process of using it. You know that you will never completely or accurately engage with the idea as the author intended, so you approach it with the idea of making an intentional mistake. You use the idea, but you distort it in the process, bending it to your own purposes. In essence, you decide to live in a double bind by bending it to your own purposes.

For Spivak, the ultimate form of playing the double bind today comes from the ab-use of the European Enlightenment. She believes that post-colonial peoples need to find a way to reinvent the Enlightenment, to ab-use the Enlightenment "to expand the scope of this by an 'intended mistake': to bequeath a geography to it" (Ibid., 20). In other words, Spivak wants to "make the Enlightenment open to a(n) (ab)-use that makes room for justice, because it takes away the absoluteness of guarantees and secures it from the moderant satire of a Candide?" (Ibid., 21). Damn you and your damn parenthetical silliness, Spivak.

Moreover, Spivak claims that this double bind can also be rendered in terms of "the contradiction between planetary poiesis (imaginative making) and a named faith with an inherited record" (Ibid., 346). The problem is between making something new in the present out of the materials that we have inherited from the past.

This double bind of present and past is a huge one for me.

For Spivak too.

Unfortunately, I am out of time.

I have to go meet a friend.

But I intended to tell you how there is a way to collapse the double bind of past and present into another double bind: that of repetition and newness.

Because this is really the problem with the relationship between past and present. How is one to go on creating something new (the present-becoming-future) while still staying true to tradition (past-becoming-present)?

To me, this is a false problem.

Nothing will ever stay the same. We live in a Heraclitan world. Everything moves and nothing stays still.

Theory, too, must move with the world. As Spivak says, "All communicated action, including self-communicated action, is destined for errancy. This is so commonsensical a point that it is almost not worth making. Yet it is so hard to make this enter into theory. In order to conserve felicitous cases, we seem to be obliged to ignore destinerrancy" (Ibid., 28). I believe with Zizek and DeLanda's reading of Deleuze, combined with my reading of Collingwood and Clausewitz, I can create a theory that accommodates the movement of the world. A theory of practice that will train people's minds to operate with the mechanisms and technologies of the present, like Spivak wishes to do, but without a firm structure that could lead to a sort of doctrinaire self-deception. Instead, I propose Collingwoodian-Clausewitzian science of human affairs.

I believe this type of theory needs to hinge on the double bind of repetition and newness. That is, the paradoxical idea that newness can only emerge through repetition.

In order for this to be clear I will have to adequately explain historical thinking. I will have to explain simulation theory of mind and how historical thinking is about simulating past thoughts in the context of your present mind. I will have to explain how this simulation amounts to a repetition, and how that repetition can only lead to something new. I'll have to show that history is a branch of literature. I'll have to show that being a form of literature is partakes primarily of narrative. I'll have to demonstrate the capacity of narrative to not only generate understanding, but to generate our selves as well.

The double bind that an aesthetic education must deal with, I believe, is not the one of Enlightenment and the Other's ab-use of it. Nor is it the tension between tradition and modernity. Both of these are indispensable concepts, unavoidably real double binds.

But it seems to me that they both collapse into a larger double bind: That of Repetition and the New.

All of this will hopefully become much clearer in my essay on historical morality and the science of human affairs as anti-regularian morality.

Monday, May 7, 2012

Art, Zen, and Insurrection: Finding Personal and Social Change in the Aesthetic Existence Part IV.4 (The Unfinished Bits).


This is what I have written of Part IV.4. of the AZI project. I intended to begin the whole section with a survey of Collingwood's late work. I got through his last books except for The New Leviathan, which occupies me at present. The purpose of this survey was to distill the political implications of his work so as to connect it all to his work on  aesthetics. But that didn't work out. The New Leviathan is way harder and way more important than I thought it was going to be. I have just received Collingwood's political essays and his history of Roman Britain. So I have quite a lot of work left to do on his politics. But I humbly offer my failed attempt at a survey of Collingwood's late work. I am also including all the notes and quotations that I pulled in preparation for the section. 

IV.4. The Aesthetic Existence And Politics Proper

1. Introduction: Politics In Collingwood, 1937-42

The point of this project is to understand if the ethical or good life can be conceptualized as an aesthetic life. After some work, I feel confident that the aesthetic existence is indeed a viable ideal. I now want to know if the aesthetic life was to be thought of as a political project. Because Foucault insists the aesthetic existence is politically charged. Collingwood, too, believes in the relationship between aesthetics and politics. He is very clear about the cultural and political importance of art, but only implies a relationship between politics and the aesthetic existence. I intend to take their claims seriously. So, this is the chapter where I attempt my most full dissection of the relationship between politics and the aesthetic existence. I’ll miss a lot of things, obviously, but I believe I have enough evidence to show some relationships between politic ideals and the ideal of the aesthetic existence. 

Foucault provided the concept of the aesthetic existence, but it was Collingwood’s Principles Of Art that really set this whole project going. It was the book that really forced a lot of my thinking together and created some kind of loose idea pool that has been growing with the project. So, I think it would be wise for me to begin this inquiry into the relationship between aesthetics and politics by returning to Collingwood. 

I think that there is a consistent relationship between aesthetics and politics in Collingwood’s final books (The Principles of Art, An Autobiography, An Essay on Metaphysics, The New Leviathan, and The Idea of History). I’m going to give these books a close look in this section to understand more fully the patterns and trends of his late work. Collingwood’s premature death makes it difficult to know what conclusions to draw from his late work. Starting in 1937 he suffered a series of strokes that led to his death in January of 1943. He never completed ‘The Principles of History’, the book he hoped would be his chief work. So what to do with this increasingly ill thinker. In particular, what to make of The New Leviathan? How am I to view his the preceding work on history, metaphysics, and aesthetics. I have to ask myself about the relationship between all of these books. I have to try and see what Collingwood’s thoughts would have been had he not died. Because I want to try and recover those thoughts that Collingwood would have expressed would he have lived. I want to see if I can carry his work one step further. See if I can help with his project of showing how “what have hitherto been regarded as philosophy and history might now be synthesized in a new study transcending and incorporating both” (NL, xxi). A well phrased statement of the style of philosophy that interests me most. I’m tempted to quote Zizek here. He has a relevant insight. While discussing this very issue of gauging an author’s oeuvre, Zizek takes the example of Kant and says, “there are two modes of repeating him: either one sticks to the letter and further elaborates or changes his system, in the spirit of neo-Kantians...; or, one tries to regain the creative impulse that Kant himself betrayed in the actualization of his systems (that is, to connect to what was already ‘in Kant more than Kant himself,’ more than his explicit system its excessive core” (IDOLC, 140, my emphasis). This is in some ways my challenge with Collingwood. I need to extract the part of him that was more Collingwood than Collingwood could be in his lifetime and make something new with it. And I believe that there are ways that I can push at Collingwood like this, try to betray him in the best sense. In particular, I think that the themes of Collingwood’s late monographs (art, culture, economics, politics, history, etc.) can only coalesce into a concern for political education for both elites and the citizenry. Further, I’ll try to show how his interests in politics and education logically lead to the need for a theory of individual decision making. 

The book that inspired this project, The Principles of Art, is a clear example of the intersection of aesthetic and political themes in Collingwood’s late work. I have spent so much of this project explicating that book, wondering about its political implications, and asking questions about the politics of art in Collingwood. I think that I highlighted the main political implications of The Principles Of Art in Part III.1 and Part IV.2. To very briefly rehash, in III.1 I argued that if we believe Collingwood’s claim that there is a ‘technical theory’ of art (in which art is identified merely with craft) that prevents us from grasping the true nature of the aesthetic, then the aesthetic existence, too, might be hindered by something like a ‘technical theory of life’. A technical theory of life would be one that told you that your life should be approached as a craft: that life should be lived according to plans, a life in pursuit of a definite end through definite means. But I don’t want to live my life that way. I want my life to be more dynamic, more reflexive than that. I don’t want to come up with a plan on how to make money or get a career. Although I do have to do that stuff. But I also want to express myself and change myself in the process and see what I can become. Life should be a conscious attempt to illuminate vague truths in the mind, to express oneself and know oneself in every action. Maybe? I’m not sure about all this. But it seems to me that life is more identified with craft than with art. I also think this has some political implications. Most of the ‘technical theories’ of life that we have access to, the ideas or narratives that give us the means to pursue life's business, happen to be narratives that support the dominant political-economic situation. The ideal of the American dream presupposes the existence of capitalist democracy, the political value of consumption and reproduction. The whole idea of college, of getting a job, it all presupposes a certain political-economic climate. If we only have access to those conceptions of life, those technical theories of existence, then imagining political and personal alternatives becomes a serious challenge. I don’t know how to conceptualize a life beyond this political system, or another political system that would somehow change me. No clue. What a feat of imagination that would take. But anyways, that is one potential set of political implications that emerges out of The Principles Of Art

The second set of implications were laid out in IV.2. I argued that Collingwood’s notion of ‘the corruption of consciousness’ was a valuable concept that links aesthetic, personal, economic, and political issues. Collingwood believes that a corrupt consciousness is one that is distracted or ‘bribed’ from its proper task of gaining self-knowledge by turning difficult impressions into ideas (see IV.2). Instead, the mind allows itself to be distracted, to find refuge in the amusement that flourishes in the modern world. The amused mind has no need to also be the inquiring mind, the reflective mind. The uncorrupt consciousness, however, is essentially the aesthetic consciousness: it is a consciousness that focuses itself on difficult emotions so as to transform them into something more manageable, as an expressed work of art or a clear idea. I then drew out the political implications of this by examining the role of amusement in American culture. With the help of Sheldon Wolin I concluded that the connection between American culture and politics consisted of a body of distracted and corrupt consciousnesses that supported a corrupt corporate democracy. The only outcome, I believe, is the politicization of the aesthetic consciousness. Which sounds Benjaminian, but I’m not sure if it is. But I ended IV.2 by claiming that we must try to educate our political elite and our citizenry so as to instill in them a consciousness that pursues truth, a consciousness that doesn’t give in to easy answers, a consciousness that seeks to simultaneously express and create itself, in short, an aesthetic consciousness. Again, I’m merely summarizing IV.2, so check it out.

Thus The Principles Of Art produces at least two relationships between politics and aesthetics in Collingwood’s work. First, there is the political danger of a technical theory of life that prevents us from imagining other ways of life, and thus other political-economic conditions. Second, there is the political implications of the corruption of consciousness. The danger of losing aesthetic consciousness, slipping into an amused state, and of witnessing a corrupt political spectacle. The Principles, however, is not a thoroughly political book. It only contains political implications. In his work after The Principles Collingwood began to pursue political questions more explicitly, while leaving references to aesthetics at a minimum. The question about the relationship between aesthetics and politics thus needs to be reversed. I need not ask ‘what are the political implications of this work on aesthetics?’ I need to ask ‘what are the aesthetic implications of this work of political thought?’ I intend to do that with four of his final books.

It is with the publication of An Autobiography in 1939 that we first see Collingwood become explicitly political. After suffering a stroke in 1937, Collingwood said his Autobiography  was intended “to put on record some brief account of the work I have not yet been able to publish, in case I am not able to publish it in full” (118). Collingwood was becoming increasingly aware of his mortality, and knew that his life may be cut short. His tone in An Autobiography expresses urgency: “I am nearly fifty, and cannot in any case hope for more than a few years in which I can do my best work” (Ibid.). Collingwood’s recognition of his own mortality pushed him to draw the full implications of his work: it forced him to reckon with the politics of his own thought. It is in the final chapter of An Autobiography, titled ‘Theory and Practice’, where Collingwood most fully states his desire for political thought and action. Collingwood claims that the philosophers of his day, the ‘realist’ school (which I know far too little about), was advocating a morally bankrupt doctrine when they claimed “that moral philosophy does no more than study in purely theoretical spirit a subject-matter which it leaves wholly unaffected” (147). Clap-trap, Collingwood says. Dangerous poppycock, he asserts. It is obvious to him that every person “in his capacity as a moral, political, or economic agent... lives not in a world of ‘hard facts’ to which ‘thoughts’ make no difference, but in a world of ‘thoughts’; that if you change the moral, political and economic ‘theories’ generally accepted by the society in which he lives, you change the character of his world; and that if you change his own ‘theories’ you change his relation to that world; so that in either case you change the ways in which he acts” (147). Not only is it erroneous to believe that moral philosophy has no connection to moral action, it is dangerous. 

Collingwood takes his political stances a step further by identifying with Marx’s ethos. He confesses that a a part of him “used to stand up and cheer, in a sleepy voice, whenever I began reading Marx.” And that even though he was never “convinced either by Marx’s metaphysics or by his economics” he still admired him because “the man was a fighter, and a grand one; and no mere fighter, but a fighting philosopher.... Marx’s was meant to solve a ‘practical’ problem; its business, as he said himself, was ‘to make the world better’” (152). What Collingwood found in Marx was a raw, practical, and above all a political philosophy. He knows that a part of him wanted “a gloves-off philosophy.... a philosophy that should be a weapon” (153). But Collingwood had to reckon with his own thought, he had to understand how to become a thoroughly political thinker, how to transform his academic work into something practical and political. He had to figure out how to follow Marx’s spirit in his own way.

He then spends a number of pages reflecting on the role of democracy in England from WWI up until his time (1939). He truly believes that English democracy is to be pursued, that it is a worthwhile political system, but one that needs to be augmented and worked on. This discussion of European politics culminates in a discussion of Fascism and the danger it presents to society as he knows it. He ends the book with a powerful paragraph, expressing his desire to fight Fascism the only way he knows how, by thinking and writing clearly about it. “I know now,” he confesses, “that the minute philosophers of my youth, for all their profession of a purely scientific detachment from practical affairs, were the propagandists of a coming Fascism. I know that Fascism means the end of clear thinking and the triumph of irrationalism. I know that all my life I have been engaged unawares in a political struggle, fighting against these things in the dark. Henceforth I shall fight in the daylight” (167, my emphasis). Collingwood here makes me want to stand up and cheer. Makes me want to say yes! Let us fight this type of thinking! Let us overcome the dangers of politicians that ‘appeal to our emotions’ and work us up into an irrational frenzy! Leading us to war, inequality, poverty, madness! 

Thus with An Autobiography we see a new Collingwood emerge. A Collingwood snapped into urgency by his impending death. A Collingwood invigorated by the example of Marx. A Collingwood eager to understand the political implications of his thought. What we must ask, therefore, is whether or not Collingwood kept his promise to himself. Do his final books seem like an attempt ‘to fight in the daylight’? I will now ask this question of An Essay On Metaphysics, The New Leviathan, and The Idea Of History

Collingwood followed 1939’s An Autobiography with 1940’s An Essay On Metaphysics. In this book we see Collingwood intensely philosophical yet attempting to access a wider audience. Collingwood, however, manages to be clear and concise despite his philosophical style. There are only certain moments when Collingwood becomes densely philosophical, such as the chapter ‘On Presupposing’. That chapter, however, is one of the most important in the book. There he first introduces the major argument of the book: that metaphysics is the science of absolute presuppositions, and that it is by necessity a historical science. An absolute presupposition is one that serves as the foundation for all other questioning, it always “stands, relatively to all questions to which it is related, as a presupposition, never as an answer” (31). To put it another way, to ask a natural scientist “ ‘But how do you know that everything that happens has a cause?’,” they would likely reply “ ‘That is a thing we take for granted in my job. We don’t question it. We don’t try to verify it. It isn’t a thing anybody has discovered, like microbes or the circulation of blood. It is a thing we just take for granted.’ “ (31). In any society, Collingwood argues, thinking is always made possible by a ‘constellation’ of absolute presuppositions. Meaning that a thought “can never be given by reference to one single absolute presupposition, it must always be given by reference to a constellation of them” (66). Furthermore, Collingwood argues that “the absolute presuppositions of any given society, at any given phase of history, form a structure which is subject to ‘strains’... of greater or less intensity, which are ‘taken up’... in various ways, but never annihilated. If the strains are too great, the structure collapses and is replaced by another, which will be a modification of the old with the destructive strain removed; a modification not consciously devised but created by a process of unconscious thought” (48). In short, we can only think with a constellation of absolute presuppositions that is subject to unconscious change. 

This means that all thinking has an unconscious foundation. This is why our knowledge often appears so intuitive that “we are not even aware that whatever we state to ourselves or others is stated in answer to a question, still less that every such question rests of presuppositions, and at least of all that among these presuppositions some are absolute presuppositions” (43). If all thought rests upon absolute presuppositions, and we are often unaware that we are making these absolute presuppositions, what hopes do we have for clear, orderly thinking? Well, Collingwood claims that this is precisely where metaphysics becomes important. If one is to think clearly, to solve the right problems by asking the right questions, then one needs to know what they presuppose absolutely. The metaphysician’s business, according to Collingwood, is, therefore, to “find out what absolute presuppositions have been made by this or that person or group of persons, on this or that occasion or group of occasions, in the course of this or that piece of thinking” (47). Because unless we know the absolute presuppositions of the past and the present we have no hope of clear and orderly thinking. Metaphysics, furthermore, must be a historical study. “When a man first begins looking into absolute presuppositions,” Collingwood claims, “it is likely that he will begin by looking into those which are made in his own time by his own countrymen, or at any rate by persons belonging to some group of which he is a member. This, of course, is already an historical inquiry” (56-57). How is one to have any sense of your own absolute presuppositions unless you know the absolute presuppositions that were made during the times prior to your own? Because those absolute presuppositions of the past obviously mutated from one constellation into the current one. The discovery of your own absolute presuppositions, therefore, must be a historical study that begins with past thought and traces its development to the present.

In any case, this is Collingwood’s definition of metaphysics, which he believes has the potential to revolutionize metaphysical study. Now, I must ask: What are the political implications of Collingwood’s work on metaphysics? Does Collingwood follow through with the promise he made in An Autobiography? Is he now ‘fighting in the daylight’? I think the answer is yes. Through his philosophical style a political vision starts to emerge. We see the politics of metaphysics first emerge in chapter thirteen, ‘The Propaganda of Irrationalism’, and we find Collingwood even more political in the book’s epilogue. 

‘The Propaganda of Irrationalism’ is contained in Part II of An Essay Of Metaphysics, which is called ‘Anti-Metaphysics’. The title of this chapter is not to be overlooked. Recall that at the end of An Autobiography Collingwood argued that the Realist philosophers “were the propagandists of a coming Fascism,” and that “Fascism means the end of clear thinking and the triumph of irrationalism” (167). Collingwood is clearly picking up on that theme again. Indeed, by discussing anti-metaphysics Collingwood is trying to explain the relationship between certain philosophical beliefs and the political-cultural decline he perceives in European civilization. According to Collingwood, anti-metaphysics is “a kind of thought that regards metaphysics as a delusion and an impediment to the progress of knowledge, and demands its abolition” (81). Furthermore, Collingwood believed that the most dangerous form of anti-metaphysics in his time was to be found in psychology. Psychology as a discipline, during Collingwood’s time, apparently claimed to “usurp the field of logic  and ethics in all their various branches, including political science, aesthetics, economics, and whatever other criteriological sciences there may be, and finally of metaphysics” (142). The bulk of Part II, therefore, is devoted to refuting psychologist’s claims about the uselessness of metaphysics. He argues that psychology, which claims to be the science of thought, can only be the science of feeling. History, he argues, is the only true science of thought. This is because all thought is necessarily historically situated. Metaphysics, therefore, as the historical study of absolute presuppositions, can be the only true science of thought. Psychology is thus a pseudo-science of thought because it has not grasped its proper role as the science of feeling. Moreover, he believes that psychology’s desire to destroy metaphysics amounts to a covert assault on the foundation of European civilization. Because according to Collingwood, “In the interests of science it is absolutely necessary that the work of metaphysics should be done” (84). 

Without metaphysics, systematic and orderly thinking is impossible. If we have no form of study to make us aware of our absolute presuppositions we can never be sure if we are really thinking in an orderly manner. Without metaphysics we run the risk of holding erroneous presuppositions. And, for Collingwood, this is why psychology may corrupt the foundations of European civilization. He asks the reader to hold a series of suppositions, claiming that 1. Europe has operated “on the belief that truth was the most important thing in the world, and that consequently scientific thinking, systematic, orderly thinking, theoretical and practical alike, pursued with all the energy at his disposal, was the most valuable thing a man could do” (133); 2.   that “within this same civilization a movement grew up hostile to these fundamental principles” (135). Not that there is a conspiracy, but that “something less conscious, less deliberate” was going on, “something more like an epidemic disease: a kind of epidemic withering of belief in the importance of truth and in the obligation to think and act in a systematic and methodical way” (Ibid.). He believes that “Such an irrationalist epidemic infecting religion would turn it from a worship of truth to a worship of emotion and a cultivation of certain emotional states” (Ibid.). This epidemic would infect European culture from top to bottom, in our homes, our schools, and even our political system. This epidemic, however, would disguise itself in the clothes of scientific thought while secretly harboring irrational elements. And this is precisely what Collingwood thought psychology was doing. He believed that psychologists were “in open defiance of the recognized canons of scientific procedure” and that they regard scientific thought as “an obsolete mentality and a thing to be treated with obloquy and contempt, not as a criticism which they must meet by reforming their work or else by abandoning it” (142). Instead, psychologists continue their work unabashed, continuing their “attempt to discredit the very idea of science,” continuing to exist as “the propaganda of irrationalism” (Ibid.). Collingwood, therefore, believes that psychology is a dangerous form of anti-metaphysics that threatens to undermine European civilization’s faith in scientific thinking, which may lead to the collapse of European civilization. For “If European civilization is a civilization based on the belief that truth is the most precious thing in the world and that pursuing it is the whole duty of man, an irrationalist epidemic if it ran through Europe unchecked would in a relatively short time destroy everything that goes by the name European civilization” (140). But how, precisely, would an irrationalist epidemic destroy a civilization?

Collingwood believes that the irrationalist epidemic has had direct effects in the political world. He claims that in a culture that values truth above all else, both political and educational institutions will reflect that desire for truth. He says that “Politics would be predominantly the attempt to build up a common life by the methods of reason (free discussion, public criticism) and subject to the sanction of reason (i.e. the ultimate test being whether the common life aimed at is a reasonable one, for for men who... agree to think in an orderly way). While “Education would be predominantly a method for inducing habits of orderly and systematic thinking” (134). Collingwood claims, however, that European civilization has shied away from these tasks. Furthermore, that we witness the power of the irrationalist epidemic at the intersection of education and politics. It is worth quoting Collingwood at length here: “And has there been a tendency of late years,” Collingwood asks, "to become impatient with the work of politically educating an entire people; to choose leaders not for their intellectual powers but for their ability to excite mass-emotions; to induce in followers not an ability to think about political problems, but certain emotions which in persons untrained to think will explode into action with no questions asked as to where such action will lead; and to suppress discussion and information in favour of what is called propaganda, that is, statements made not because they are true but because they generate these emotions that spark them into action? And have these changes gone so far that even the characteristic facial expression of a political leader has changed from the expression of a thinker (the mathematician-thinker’s face of a Napoleon, the humanist-thinker’s face of a Gladstone) to the expression of a hypnotist, with scowling forehead and glaring eye?" (139). Anti-metaphysics, therefore, is no small matter. It is of the highest importance. For if European civilization is founded upon systematic, orderly, scientific thinking (from out politics to our education), then an irrationalist movement that chides metaphysical work has the potential to undermine the foundations of our civilization. So Collingwood believes.

The politics of Collingwood’s metaphysics comes through even more explicitly in the book’s epilogue. As if his statements in Part II weren’t strong enough, Collingwood ends the book by declaring that European civilization needs a renewed commitment to scientific thinking, and that this must involve a renewed commitment to metaphysical study. He says that the irrationalist movement has created “in the body politic a demand that scientific thinking should be put down by force,” and that it is secretly working “unconsciously perhaps but still working, to obstruct [scientific] advancement and weaken the resistance with which that body is bound in honour to confront the onslaughts of irrationalism” (342). Collingwood ends the book by saying that he knows that no one is consciously working against reason, but that they have been led “blindly into the ranks of that army” because there is “a misunderstanding as to the nature of the issues they have discussed,” and that “These issues are metaphysical” (343). By misunderstanding these metaphysical issues, philosophers have been led to take pseudo-metaphysical questions for true metaphysics. And given that metaphysical work is a prerequisite of scientific work, these philosophers have tried “with a clumsy hand to put back the clock of scientific progress, [they have] have in reality stopped it” (343). Collingwood’s treatise on metaphysics is, therefore, nothing less than an attempt to reinvigorate European civilization’s commitment to truth. It is a call for the use of reason in educational, and most importantly, in the political world. The final paragraph of the book reads: “This is my reason for offering to the public what might seem essentially an academic essay, suitable only for readers who are already, like myself, committed to an interest in metaphysics. The fate of European science and European civilization is at stake. The gravity of the peril lies especially in the fact that so few recognize any peril to exist. When Rome was in danger, it was the cackling of the sacred geese that saved the Capitol. I am only a professorial goose, consecrated with a cap and gown and fed at a college table; but cackling is my job, and cackle I will” (343). Collingwood knows his professorial duty (to think clearly), and wishes to think about things that will not simply delight his fellow philosophers, but things that matter in the life of a civilization. Things like politics, culture, and education. 

In An Essay On Metaphysics, I claim, Collingwood lives up to his promise to ‘fight in the daylight’. He explicitly calls out psychology as compromising the standard procedures for scientific thinking. He explains how this threat to reason, this epidemic of irrationality, has manifested itself at multiple levels of society, including the political, cultural, and educational. And, ultimately, he believes that it constitutes a threat to the foundations of European civilization. In many ways we are seeing his work in The Principles Of Art and An Autobiography carried even further, this time through the topic of metaphysics. Despite the shift of topic, the themes are relatively consistent. He still fears that European civilization has been infected with a mental disease. That this disease is somehow connected to our relationship with truth (because aesthetics and metaphysics, for Collingwood, are both means of accessing truth). And he believes that our relationship towards the idea of truth is fundamentally connected to our political-economic culture. So far, from 1937 onward, Collingwood appears to be consistent in his political concerns. It is always, however, a constellation of concerns, never a static or vague concern for European civilization. But, as I said, always a concern about the relationship between truth, science, politics, economics, and education. First he approached these problems from the point of view of aesthetics. Then he pondered them from the point of view of his own life and thinking. And now we have just seen him approach the same constellation of problems from the point of view of metaphysics. Now, I’d like to see how Collingwood approaches these political problems in The Idea Of History, how he believed history could shed light on these problems. 

Approaching the political implications of Collingwood’s work on history is tricky for several reasons. On the one hand, we must do it, for Collingwood claimed that history was the highest form of knowledge, and no analysis of Collingwood’s oeuvre would be complete unless it took his claims about history seriously. The deeper difficulty, however, surrounds the status of his books that expressly deal with history. The Idea Of History, for example, was compiled from manuscripts by a student, and some have criticized his arrangement of the material. The Idea Of History, therefore, cannot be considered an authoritative statement of Collingwood’s conclusions about historical knowledge. Furthermore, the recovery of lost manuscripts and their publication as The Principles Of History complicates this task even further. In short, Collingwood didn’t live to complete his work on history. Drawing certain conclusions from this writing, therefore, is a difficult task. In this section, however, I’d like to look at the material in The Idea Of History that is expressly political, just to provide a tentative statement about the politics of Collingwood’s history.

So, then, what precisely is political in The Idea Of History? I would like to focus on one of Collingwood’s claims from The Idea Of History. That “the revolutionary can only regard his revolution as a progress in so far as he is also an historian, genuinely re-enacting in his own historical thought the life he nevertheless rejects” (326). This statement is quite dense and rests on several prior claims. Namely, 1. that progress is the replacement of the good by the better, and 2. that history is only the re-enactment (simulation) of past thoughts in the mind of the historian. “In order to conceive a change as progress,...” Collingwood asserts, “ the person who has made it must think of what he has abolished as good, and good in certain definite ways. This he can only do on condition of his knowing what the old way of life was like, that is, having historical knowledge of his society’s past while he is living in the present he is creating: for historical knowledge is simply the re-enactment of past experiences in the mind of the present thinker. Only thus can the two ways of life be held in the same mind for a comparison of their merits, so that a person choosing one and rejecting the other can know what he has gained and what he has lost, and decide that he has chosen the better” (Ibid.). There is a lot going on here. But I believe these claims about the relationship between historical knowledge and political action is essentially an epistemological argument. 

For Collingwood history is the science of mind and the epistemological foundation of all knowledge. The supreme historical question is thus an epistemological one. It is, ‘How do I have knowledge of a mind?’ For historical study is simultaneously about gaining access to other mind’s while learning about your own mind. He believed that without historical knowledge we will be unable to know ourselves: “Men ill supplied with historical knowledge,” he claims, “cannot tell whether a habit they possess was imposed upon them lately by a divine autocrat or long ago by a divine ancestor in whom the wisdom of the tribe was incarnate” (An Essay On Metaphysics, 271). Thus man requires some historical knowledge of himself, because without this self-knowledge he would have no firm epistemological foundation. Collingwood says that “his knowledge of other things is imperfect: for to know something without knowing that one knows it is only a half-knowing, and to know that one knows is to know oneself” (TIOH, 205). Thus we can see, roughly, how history must be the epistemological anchor of all knowledge. No knowledge without self-knowledge. No self-knowledge without historical knowledge. Therefore all knowledge depends on historical knowledge. Simple enough. But how is this historical-self-knowledge achieved? By what methods or means is the mind able to understand past minds?

The answer to this question is to be found in Collingwood’s notion of re-enactment. Collingwood believed that historical knowledge can only be achieved if a historian is able to re-think past thoughts in his own mind, or, as Collingwood puts it: “the historian must re-enact the past in his own mind” (Ibid., 282). Simply put, re-enactment is a process of using evidence to recreate, rethink, a thought that someone expressed in the past. We ‘encapsulate’ their past thoughts in the present context of our own mind. But why would this process of re-enacting other people’s thoughts result in an understanding of ourselves? Collingwood answers this question very clearly: "It thus may be said that historical inquiry revels to the historian the powers of his own mind. Since all he can know historically is thoughts that he can re-think for himself, the fact of his coming to know them shows him that his mind is able (or by the very effort of studying them has become able) to think in these ways. And conversely, whenever he finds certain historical matters unintelligible, he has discovered a limitation of his own mind; he has discovered that there are certain ways in which he is not, or no longer, or not yet, able to think" (Ibid., my emphasis, 218). I would like to express this same idea using some of my own language.

I think that I can identify two distinct moments in the re-enactment of thought that would contribute to self-knowledge in two different ways. I express them in two phrases, ‘the collision of encapsulated thought’ and ‘the diffusion of encapsulated minds’. The collision of of thought refers to the moment when a new thought jars you with its capacity to challenge the way you think. When you successfully re-enact another person’s thoughts and encapsulate them in your own mind, the encapsulated mind does not just gently appear in your mind, it crashes into the sea of your thoughts, creating waves and ripples. Some thoughts are commonplace or less jarring and create tiny little ripples, hardly even noticeable sometimes. But other thoughts have a heaviness that can revolutionize your thinking and living. A collision of thought like that can force you to learn something very serious about the way you think. A collision like that forces you to discover the limits of your capacity for thinking and empathizing. This collision of thought is the first way that re-enactment can provide you with self-knowledge.

The second way that re-enactment could lead to self-knowledge is this idea of the diffusion of encapsulated minds. The successful encapsulation of someone’s thought is a conscious and controlled process. You manage to use consciousness and your imagination to form another person’s thoughts into a firm object in your mind. It feels appropriate to refer to it as an orb  of sorts, a physical capsule created by consciousness that keeps a persons thought distinct in the sea of your thoughts. But when consciousness ceases to maintain that firm capsule that mind does not simply disappear. It leaves a residue in your mind that mingles into the sea of thought. It is as if another person’s thoughts arrive encapsulated in our mind from elsewhere, they crash into the sea of thought and create the waves they do. But after arriving their thought leaks out of the capsule and into the pool of our mind. Consciousness is the stuff that brings these encapsulated minds into the sea of our thought, but forms of consciousness always decay, inevitably diffusing these encapsulated minds into our own. This is much like Nicholas Carr’s claim that when we learn other people’s ideas they mingle in our memory and create a unique form of thought that is your own. Seeing as how Collingwood declares all reading to be a matter of re-enactment, it is safe to say that Carr’s argument about memory can be assimilated into my description of re-enactment. The process he describes, too, can be explained in terms of re-enactment, and the collision and diffusion of minds. The process of re-enactment, therefore, can lead to self-knowledge both in that it can shock us into thinking new ways thus exposing our limitations, it forces minds to collide, and in that those minds then diffuse into our own, giving us new material with which to form our own thinking, thus coming to know ourselves by creating ourselves. 

To these we must add Collingwood’s claim that re-enactment is the best way to go about making political decisions. He claims that only through re-enactment can a revolutionary be sure they were truly bringing about progress: “Only thus can the two ways of life be held in the same mind for a comparison of their merits, so that a person choosing one and rejecting the other can know what he has gained and what he has lost, and decide that he has chosen the better” (326, my emphasis). Forgive the repeated quotation, but it’s a strong one. The political implications of historical thinking (re-enactment) thus become clear if we highlight these three ways it affects the mind. It forces people to come to terms with the limitations of their own thinking through collisions of thought, it gives people enriched minds through the diffusion of other minds into their own, and it gives us a powerful way to make comparisons, not only in large political situations, but in every day social situations. I will venture to say that both populations and politicians should to be willing to engage in these effects of re-enactment. If we want to bring about progress or change things we need to be open to the colliding with, diffusing, and comparing of minds. We need that sort of historical-self knowledge. ‘Revolutionaries ought to be historians’. What an interesting thing for Collingwood to say.

These are the only political implications of Collingwood’s historical work that I want to explore. I need to read a few essays on it, I need to read The Principles Of History. I know, for example, Collingwood believes that Duty is the highest form of practical reason, and that its theoretical counterpart, that is, the highest form of theoretical reason, is history. Duty, Collingwood believed, was the proper foundation for morality. Historical thinking, therefore, is somehow the proper basis of morality or something. I’m not sure how this works. But, as you can see, there are plenty of things political about Collingwood’s historical thinking. I’m just not there yet with him. 

The last book left in this survey is The New Leviathan. There is much to say about its political implications because it is Collingwood’s most sustained effort to write on political issues. One of the most important questions to ask, however, is about the relationship between TNL and TIOH. In particular, I would like to explore three elements of TNL: 1. Collingwood’s claims that duty is the highest form of practical thinking, and that historical thinking is its theoretical counterpart (that is, the highest form of theoretical reason); 2. The relationship between his work on the problem of civilization and his idea of historical re-enactment; 3. Finally, the possibility that TNL implies the need for a historical-philosophical pedagogy. These are the main three things that I would like to distill out of The New Leviathan for the purposes of this larger project.
Notes and quotes:
“In the interests of science it is absolutely necessary that the work of metaphysics should be done: done not in the sense of being carried to completion, for it is a work which in the nature of it can never be completely, but done as required, piece by piece, when the need arises” (84-85). 
92
Essay on metaphysics quotes
“And has there been a tendency of late years to become impatient with the work of politically educating an entire people; to choose leaders not for their intellectual powers but for their ability to excite mass-emotions; to induce in followers not an ability to think about political problems, but certain emotions which in persons untrained to think will explode into action with no questions asked as to where such action will lead; and to suppress discussion and information in favour of what is called propaganda, that is, statements made not because they are true but because they generate these emotions or spark them into action?” (EOM, 139). ‘To induce in followers not an ability to think about political problems’. This has a clear connection to reenactment/simulation. Collingwood never lived to pull out the implications of reenactment, the political nature of it is here in this passage. 

IV.4.1
What I really want to do here is to apply the conclusions of Part III.3 to an analysis of individual minds. In particular, Scarry’s work on how habit is a necessary part of good decision making. So it will be Scarry as a corroboration of politics. We should also discuss more macro issues like common culture, the collapse of magic, the mass corruption of consciousness, etc.. SO, there should be two parts, one having to do with those macro issues, and one about individual political decision making as an aesthetic process.

For the section on Habit: In a society that seeks only truth and orderly thinking, “Education would be predominantly a method for inducing habits of orderly and systematic thinking” (Essay on Metaphysics,134). 
IV.4.2

17. Art As A Source Of Common Culture and Politics

“Now, in so far as the activity of expression creates a deposit of habits in the agent, and of by-products in his world, these habits and these by-products become things utilizable by himself and others for ulterior ends” (275).

“Words in their entirety are coming to resemble the formulae which used to be reserved for greeting and leave-taking.... Spontaneity and objectivity in discussing matters are disappearing even in the most intimate circle, just as in politics debate has long since been supplanted by the assertion of power. Speaking takes on a malevolent set of gestures that bode no good” (Adorno, 90) - Fits here because the economic system is our source of common culture and it structures how we talk to people. Art could maybe do that for others.
“We have hardly any remnant of the idea in our society, that the principal work of art which one has to take care of, the main area to which one must apply aesthetic values, is oneself, one’s life, one’s existence” (Foucault Reader, 362). 

“Words in their entirety are coming to resemble the formulae which used to be reserved for greeting and leave-taking.... Spontaneity and objectivity in discussing matters are disappearing even in the most intimate circle, just as in politics debate has long since been supplanted by the assertion of power. 
Speaking takes on a malevolent set of gestures that bode no good” (Adorno, 90) - My language is politically conditioned in that it is conditioned by the economic system and stuff. But that doesn’t mean that changing it is political

10. Zizek And Foucault On The Politics Of Language And Habit
  • The issue of habit in general has to be brought up here, the political implications of habit, the violent (and linguistic? categorical?) destruction of the self that has to accompany political and personal change. I want to use both Zizek and Foucault to talk about habit. With Zizek we see that habit is a politicized thing because it is the fundament of ideology. So does Foucault’s attempts to change habit constitute something political? This seems like an allusion to what we will discuss once again in IV.3. Need to deal with Hegel as a reference. Mainly prepare for IV.3 here, allude to it.
  • Zizek says that all language is violent. That language creates habits. That habits are the foundation of ourselves, our identities, and our societies. He also says that people don’t want to change their habits because they are changing themselves. This is so Zen and so war. We need to change ourselves so that we can change our society. We need to destroy ourselves so that we can enact social change.
  • Habit as  ‘depersonalized’ willing - “And the same goes for my emotions: their display is not purely natural or spontaneous, we learn to cry or laugh at appropriate moments (recall how, for the Japanese, laughter functions in a different way than for us in the West: a smile can also be a sign of embarrassment and shame). The external mechanization of emotions from the ancient Tibetan praying wheel which prays for me to today’s "canned laughter" where the TV set laughs for me, turning my emotional display quite literally into a mechanic display of the machine) is thus based in the fact that emotional displays, including the most "sincere" ones, are already in themselves "mechanized." - However, the highest level (and, already, self-sublation) of a habit is language as the medium of thought – in it, the couple of possession and withdrawal is brought to extreme. The point is not only that, in order to "fluently" speak a language, we have to master its rules mechanically, without thinking about it; much more radically, the co-dependence of insight and blindness determines the very act of understanding: when I hear a word, not only do I immediately abstract from its sound and "see through it" to its meaning (recall the weird experience of becoming aware of the non-transparent vocal stuff of a word – it appears as intrusive and obscene…), but I have to do it if I am to experience meaning.” 
“This means that habit also complicates the relationship between possibility and actuality: habit is stricto sensu the actuality of a possibility.”
“The conclusion is thus clear, almost Sartrean: man does not have a permanent substance or universal essence; he is in his very core a man of habits, a being whose identity is formed through the elevation of contingent external accidents/encounters into an internal(ized) universal habit.” Neuroplasticity, also.
From Madness and Habit In German Idealism.
  • This is like on page 112 when he talks about generalizing vs. individualizing 
“‘the artist’s powers can be displayed only when he uses them upon a subject that is worthy of them’.... It regards the subject as an integral element in the work of art; it holds that, in order to appreciate any given work of art, one must be interested in its subject for its own sake, as well as in the artist’s handling of it” (71) I suppose in this section what I’m really after is the use of art for cultural change, which happens through subversion. The question is of metaphors of war.
We need a section called (or just addressing) the violence of art.

“The task of art today is to bring chaos into order” (Adorno, 222).

“Every work of art is an uncommitted crime” (Adorno, 111).

18.Fighting The Collapse of Magic: Reinvigorating Ritual and Small Talk

“Ours is an age when people pride themselves on having abolished magic and pretend that they have no superstitions. But they have as many as ever. The difference is that they have lost the art, which must always be a magical art, of conquering them. So it is a special characteristic of modern European civilization that metaphysics is habitually frowned upon and the existence of absolute presuppositions denied. This habit is neurotic” (Essay On Metaphysics, 46). 

“Magic is a representation where the emotion evoked is an emotion valued on account of its function in practical life, evoked in order that it may discharge that function, and fed by the generative or focusing magical activity into the practical life that needs it. Magical activity is a kind of dynamo supplying the mechanism of practical life with the emotion current that drives it. Hence magic is a necessity for every sort and condition of man, and is actually found in every healthy society. A society which thinks, as our own thinks, that it has outlived the need of magic, is either mistaken in that opinion, or else it is a dying society, perishing for a lack of interest in its own maintenance” (69). The question is what constitutes a useful means of improving our social existence. I believe we have relied too much on the technical theory of life and the technical theory of society.

“I have insisted that magic is a thing which every community must have; and in a civilization that is rotten with amusement, the more magic we produce the better. If we were talking about the moral regeneration of our world, I should urge the deliberate creation of a system of magic, using as its vehicles such things as the theatre and the profession of letters, as one indispensable kind of means to that end” (278). 

“A society which thinks, as our own thinks, that it has outlived the need of magic, is either mistaken in that opinion, or else it is a dying society, perishing for a lack of interest in its own maintenance” (69). The question is what constitutes a useful means of improving our social existence. I believe we have relied too much on the technical theory of life and the technical theory of society.
In this section we need to draw on Zizek’s analysis of politeness in chapter 1 of IDOLC - he explains how the collapse of politeness and ritual leads to things like torture.

19. Gandhi As Politico-Existential Aesthetician 

20. Zen, Simulation Theory, and Intellectual Insurrection: Battling the ‘Corruption of Consciousness’
“The effect of this experience on the feelings themselves is to make them less violent.... their violence, or power of determining our actions (including our thoughts, so far as we can be said to think at this primitive stage), is abated. They are no longer like storms or earthquakes, devastating our life. They become domesticated; real experiences still, and experiences of the same kind as before; but fitted into the fabric of our life instead of proceeding on their own way regardless of its structure.... in asserting ourselves as against our feelings we have asserted in principle a structure of some kind, though as yet an indeterminate one. In becoming aware of myself I do not yet know at al what I am; but I do know that I am something to which this feeling belongs, not something belonging to it” (209). This also belongs in the section on insurgency and mindfulness.

When we begin attending to a feeling and then choose to ignore it we are dealing with the corruption of consciousness. “I call this the ‘corruption’ of consciousness; because consciousness permits itself to be bribed or corrupted in the discharge of its function, being distracted from a formidable task towards an 
easier one. So far from being a bare possibility, it is an extremely common fact” (217).

These feelings that we find difficult to ignore, the feelings that corrupt our consciousness are not ignored, they are disowned. “Very soon we learn to bolster up this self-deceit by attributing the disowned experience to other people. Coming down to breakfast out of temper, but refusing to allow that the ill humor so evident in the atmosphere is our own, we are distressed to find the whole family suffering agonies of crossness” (218).

“When consciousness is corrupted, imagination shares the corruption” (218). We need to write about egocentric simulations and simulations as the battle grounds. Just like in Foucault’s DnP.
Collingwood says that Spinoza’s problem with ethics was “the question how man, being ridden by feelings, can so master them that his life, from being a continuous passio, an undergoing of things, can become a continuous actio, or doing of things” His solution is that “As soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of a passion, it ceases to be a passion” (219). The task is to dominate your emotions.

“A man whose consciousness is corrupt has no mitigations, either within or without. So far as that corruption masters him, he is a lost soul, concerning whom hell is no fable. And whether or no the psycho-analysts have found the means to rescue him, or to save those in whom this evil has advanced less far, their attempt to do so is an enterprise that has already won a great place in the history of man’s warfare with the power of darkness” (221).

“his knowing of this new world is also the making of the new world which he is coming to know. The world he has come to know is a world consisting of language; a world where everything has the property of expressing emotion.... He is not god, but a finite mind still at a very elementary stage in the development of his powers. He has made it ‘out of’ what is presented to him in the still more elementary stage of purely psychical experience” (291). 
Page 292 also has some stuff about creating the world.

21. Synthetic Experience and Creativity
“A fit of anger, passing away, leaves a fading trace of itself in our actual feeling, progressively swamped beneath feelings of other kinds, for an indeterminable length of time. So long as any such trace remains, attention may single it out and, by a similar process, reconstitute, the original feeling in the shape of an idea” (211). Empathy and traces. Synthetic traces would be valuable in real life.
“To sit in this way is to be Buddha himself, to be as the historical Buddha” (160). Zazen as synthetic exp of Buddha.

22. Revolution And Synthetic Experience: Collingwood On Progress In History

23. Art As A Source Of New Status Function Declarations

24. Collingwood, Philosophy as Art, and the Reinvigoration of Moral Politics Through Moral Philosophy 
“Whatever you do, it should be an expression of the same deep activity” (Suzuki, 50). - This is what we should use when we first define the content of action. Then we can go into the stuff about creating habits to talk about the modification of the content of our action.
“An activity in ourselves which produces a change in us but none in our environment we call theoretical; one which produces a change in our environment but none in ourselves we call practical” (289). Art is both theoretical and practical. When we have a moral problem we are dealing with something both practical and theoretical. “But if I solve this difficulty the result will not be a change in myself only. It will involve changes in my environment too; for out of the new character which I shall acquire there will flow actions which will certain to some extent alter my world. Hence morality belongs to a region of experience which is neither theoretical nor practical, but both at once” (289-90). sounds like modifying the content of action for the future to me. Also sounds ‘political.’

25. Art As A Source Of Mindfulness

26. The Artist As Modifying The Capital Of The Economy Of The Imagination

27. Copyright Law And Creativity: David Shields And Economic Analysis Of Art
In order for artists to be supported they often find they must renounce “his calling and uses the art which he has acquired in a way which negates its fundamental nature, by turning journalist or advertisement artist or the like a degradation far more frightful than the prostitution or enslavement of the mere body” (34).

“A new code of artistic morality grew up in the nineteenth century, according to which plagiarism was a crime. I will not ask how much that had to do, whether as cause or as effect, with the artistic barrenness and mediocrity of the age (though it is obvious, I think, that a man who can be annoyed with another for stealing his ideas must be pretty poor in ideas, as well as much less concerned for the intrinsic value of what ideas he has than for his own reputation); I will only say that this fooling about personal property must cease. Let painters and writers and musicians steal with both hands whatever they can use, wherever they can find it” (320).

“The aesthetic activity is an activity of thought in the form of consciousness, converting into imagination an experience which, apart from being so converted, is sensuous. This activity is a corporate activity belonging not to any one human being but to a community. It is performed not only by the man whom we individualistically call the artist, but partly by all the other artists of whom we speak as ‘influencing’ him, where we really mean collaborating with him” (324).

“we must get rid of the conception of artistic ownership.... the reason why our artists are in such a poor way is because of that very individuals which these laws enforce.... If he could take what he wants wherever he could find it, as Euripides and Dante and Michelangelo and Shakespeare and Bach were free, his larder would always be full, and his cookery might be worth tasting” (325).

“If any one thinks that the law of copyright has fostered better art than those barbarous times could produce, I will not try to convert him” (326).